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Abstract: This paper responds to the following question: “What are the 
issues concerned with potential educational reform that arise from 
Huebner’s critical encounter with Heidegger and the tradition in 
education and curriculum theory?” In attempting a rejoinder, I revisit 
Huebner’s groundbreaking essay, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s 
Temporality,” which introduces the phenomenological method in 
education and curriculum studies, with the goal of examining in detail 
the underlying themes, issues, and concepts, which ground Huebner’s 
reconceptualization of curriculum reform, as they emerge from 
Heidegger’s philosophy. I show that Huebner’s understanding of Being-
in-the-world in terms of the design of the educational environment, not 
only mirrors, but as well, embodies the flux, flow, and rhythmic 
dynamics of history’s “dialectic” unfolding as a temporal phenomenon, 
which for Heidegger represents our authentic “historizing” in the 
“moment of vision,” or Augenblick, and this for Heidegger is the 
definitive embodiment of Dasein’s authentic mode of existence as 
historical Being-in-the-world as Being-with Others. 
 
Key words: Heidegger, Dwayne Huebner, phenomenology, philosophy 
of education 
 
his essay engages in a close reading of the concepts that Dwayne 
Huebner originally adopted for inclusion in his curriculum philosophy 
by examining the essay, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s 
Temporality,”1 focusing on the sources that emerge directly from Heidegger’s 
philosophy, including the phenomenological-fundamental-ontology of Dasein 
                                                 
1 Pinar writes of the essay in the following manner when outlining the history of 
phenomenology in curriculum studies: “Dwayne Huebner introduced phenomenology to 
curriculum studies in the 1960s. Perhaps his ‘Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,’ 
read to the 1967 Ohio State University Curriculum Theory Conference and printed in Theory into 





124     HUEBNER’S CRITICAL ENCOUNTER 
as it is presented in Being and Time, which will then be related back to Huebner’s 
work through hermeneutic exegesis and critique. Three sections form this 
essay: (1) Huebner’s critique of learning and knowledge within “traditionalist” 
and “concept-empiricist” curriculum ideology along with outlining a view of 
the human and world these aforementioned curriculum movements adopt in 
terms of Cartesian dualism; (2) The interpretation of ecstatic temporality as it 
emerges from Heidegger’s thought and is assimilated by Huebner into the 
philosophy of curriculum with the purpose of identifying the deleterious 
effects the inauthentic notion of time, as a linear phenomenon, has on the 
education of students; and (3) The critical analysis of authentic learning and 
curriculum design, which is related to the unfolding of what Huebner terms the 
“individual-world dialectic,” which consists of understanding and interpreting 
the world in terms of a referential totality directed toward the student’s 
ownmost potentiality-for-Being as a member of a learning community, i.e., her 
authentic historical Being-in-the-world as Being-with others (historicity).2 I conclude 
each section with thoughts on the potential implication these ideas might have 
for the present and future conception of our educational practices. Ultimately, 
I attempt to formalize the role Heidegger’s philosophy plays in inspiring 
Huebner’s authentic reconceived understanding of curriculum and the human 
being along with the potential impact this philosophy has for a reinterpretation 
and reevaluation of our conceptions of knowledge, students, and learning in 
education. 
 Since this essay engages in philosophical archeology, concerned as it is 
with elucidating origins, it must be noted that any philosophy of education 
inspired by Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of Being and Time requires 
clarification and justification at the outset. This is because the issue of 
metaphysics as related to contemporary democratic education continues to be 
heatedly debated in the philosophy of education. We must ask: Will the 
attempted appropriation of Heidegger’s philosophy for the purpose of 
contemporary educational reform betray the original metaphysical project of 
Heidegger? Although a variety of responses have been offered by scholars, 
with some drawing decidedly pessimistic conclusions, I argue that it is not only 
possible to find value in Heidegger’s thought of 1927 and early 1930s, it is 
possible to do so in manner that remains true to the development of his 
metaphysical philosophy during that historical period. 3 For in 1933, within the 
Rectoral Address delivered at Freiburg University, The Self-Assertion of the 
German University, Heidegger embraces the potential of metaphysics for 
                                                                                                                  
in Curriculum Studies,” in Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological and Deconstructed Text 
(London: Routledge, 1992), 235. 
2 Huebner uses the term “historicity” as opposed to “historicality” in his essay, and 
this usage is consistent with Stambough’s (1996) translation of Being and Time. Macquarrie and 
Robinson, however, use the term ‘historicality’. Since I incorporate the Macquarrie and Robinson 
translation throughout, I use the term “historicality” when referring to Dasein’s authentic 
process of historizing as Being-in-the-world as Being-with others. 
3 James Magrini, “Worlds Apart in the Curriculum: Heidegger, Technology, and the 
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inspiring a sweeping reform of the system of higher education in Germany. 
Indeed, education at this time for Heidegger represents a distinctly and 
thoroughgoing metaphysical project. It is possible to marshal a defense of this 
claim by attending to the commentaries of Wolin and Lowith, both of whom, 
although disagreeing on the exact political implications of this document, 
identify the common metaphysical-ontological ground in Heidegger’s 
philosophy of education during the early and mid-1930s.  
As Wolin writes, Heidegger’s conception of education, as expressed in 
the Rectoral Address and other political writings of the 1930s, should be read 
as advancing “the existential analytic of Being and Time”4 in terms of the 
ontological-existential structures of Being-towards-death, destiny, ecstatic 
temporality, and the authentic notion of freely choosing to choose oneself and 
community amid possibilities that are at once given and inherited. Heidegger 
conceives the entire reformation of higher education in Germany in terms of 
an urgent spiritual and intellectual mission. Education, as a mode of self-
assertion, must above all else draw its transcendent power from the “essence of 
science (Wissenschaft) in its innermost necessity […] and through science, 
educators and disciplines of those leaders and guardians of the fate”5 hold the 
promise of inspiring the authentic historizing of Dasein. Wissenschaft, as 
employed by Heidegger in the address, contrary to the common rendering of 
this German term as science, or knowledge through natural science, as stated 
by translator William C. Lewis, is a “central motif in his important texts from 
1929 to 1935”6 and conceived by Heidegger as a special form of philosophical 
insight within which the “Seinsfrage (the question of Being) occupies its rightful 
pride of place.”7 Wissenschaft as thus defined is properly understood as both 
spiritual and intellectual, in terms of the special sense of a “knowing resolve 
[wissende Entschlossenheit] toward the essence of Being.”8  
According to Heidegger, the essence of Wissenschaft, which emerges 
from the concern with Being, is accompanied, and indeed preceded, by a mode 
of attunement that inspires Dasein’s “unsheltered standing firm in the amidst of the 
uncertainty of the totality of being, which alone might result in an authentically 
transformed spiritual world.”9 Heidegger’s inquiry into the essence of education 
is thus grounded in the philosophical potential of our “being gripped, which must 
determine and attune us”10 for our ontological-historical vocation, through 
which we are first able to grasp and formulate the philosophical question of 
Being, and this for Heidegger occurs through the “the fundamental attunement of 
                                                 
4 Richard Wolin, The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1998), 26. 
5 Martin Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” in The Heidegger 
Controversy: A Critical Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 30. 
6 William C. Lewis, (translator’s note) The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader, 30. 
7 Ibid., 30. 
8 Carl Lowith, “The Political Implications of Heidegger’s Existentialism,” in ibid., 177. 
9 Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University,” 33. 
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philosophizing.”11 Heidegger is clear that in order for the system of higher 
education to embrace Wissenschaft, or the philosophical understanding of our 
ontological potential as humans, two things are necessary:  
 
[F]irst, the teachers and students must each in their own 
way be seized by the idea of science and remain seized by it. 
At the same time however, this concept of science must 
penetrate into and transform the basic forms in which the 
teachers and students collectively pursue their respective 
scholarly activities.12  
 
As will be elucidated in this essay, in relation to what has been stated 
above, it is possible to interpret and understand Huebner’s philosophy of 
education (and curriculum), which is both phenomenological and ontological 
in nature, as emerging from the very ground of metaphysics – specifically as 
defined by Heidegger in the 1929-30 lecture course, The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics: “Metaphysics is a questioning in which we inquire into beings as a 
whole, and inquire in such a way that in doing so we ourselves, the questioners, 
are thereby [attuned and] also included in the question, placed into question.”13 
 
Huebner’s Critique of Traditional Curriculum Theory: 
Navigating the World of Present-at-Hand Entities 
 
Huebner adopts the view that learning, taken as the organizing 
component around which the curriculum turns is mistaken, for it is only one 
component within an ensemble of unique and specific concerns that should 
inform the school’s curricular vision. However, it must be noted that Huebner 
is critical of the form of learning associated with social efficiency ideology, i.e., 
learning as a process of knowledge acquisition, linked with the current 
“scientific” trend in curriculum that demonstrates a “dependence on 
psychological language or the language of other behavioral scientists,”14 which 
engenders the bias in curriculum philosophy favoring “positivistic thought.”15 
In addition to being critical of those reducing learning to the study of meta-
cognition, basic cognitive processes, and the transfer of knowledge to students 
through ever-greater hyper-efficient strategies for processing information, 
Huebner is also critical of curriculum design that privileges a single form of 
knowledge linked with scientific thematizing, which is abstract, conceptual, and 
serves the instrumental purpose of preparing the student for her life beyond 
                                                 
11 Martin Heidegger, Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. 
by William McNeill (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1995), 9. 
12 Heidegger, “The Self-Assertion of the German University, 36.  
13 Heidegger, op cit., 12-13/9. 
14 Dwayne Huebner, D. “Knowledge: An Instrument of Man,” in The Lure of the 
Transcendent: Collected Essays By Dwayne E. Huebner (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
1999), 225. 
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the institution. In opposition to this limited view, Huebner sees the advantage 
in recognizing and embracing various forms of learning and knowledge in the 
curriculum. Although Huebner links authentic knowledge with know-how, this is 
not to say that it requires a “pragmatic or socially functional use,”16 rather he 
views authentic learning in terms of student participation in social activities 
within the classroom, which include getting along with others while engaged in 
heuristic learning experiences that enable the student to “discover who he is 
and what he may become.”17     
It is possible to interpret Huebner’s authentic notion of learning, 
which emerges within the context of the curriculum shaped by the unfolding of 
the individual-world dialectic, functioning as the hub around which the re-
conceived notion of curriculum turns. Huebner’s authentic notion of learning, 
as a process of understanding through interpretation and meaning-making, 
situates the student within the world of the curriculum wherein the classroom 
resembles the authentic world of Dasein as presented by Heidegger, i.e., a 
referential totality, or system of assignments and references, that we share 
intimately with others, which “lets entities be encountered in the kind of Being that 
belongs to involvements”18 to which “Dasein assigns itself,”19 thus making up “the 
worldhood of the world.”20 Prior to analyzing Huebner’s authentic notion of 
learning, it is best to unpack his critique of the epistemological-ontological 
views of both traditional curriculum-making (e. g., the Tyler rationale) and 
curriculum making in terms of concept empiricism, highlighted by emerging 
scientism, as the means by which to determine authentic student learning (e.g., 
Darling-Hammond, et al). Huebner’s general critique of learning in education is 
two-fold and can be traced to both Heidegger’s early phenomenological 
ontology of Dasein and his later philosophy relating to technology, poetic 
human dwelling, and the concern with authentic thinking as a meditative 
emersion in Being, and focuses on (1) the notion that all authentic learning 
might be reduced to knowledge in the form of abstract conceptualization, or 
scientific thematizing - calculative thought as described by Heidegger – valued for 
its use in manipulating and mastering objective, empirical reality, which is a 
view to knowledge grounded in (2) the Cartesian understanding of the human 
as an interiorized subject who resides at a metaphysical and epistemological 
remove from the objective world.       
According to Huebner, within education “the language with the 
greatest acceptance today are those governed by or are imitations of science.” 21 
When learning is the focus of the curriculum within education philosophies 
                                                 
16 Dwayne Hubner, “Curriculum as a Concern for Man’s Temporality,” in The Lure of 
the Transcendent: Collected Essays By Dwayne E. Huebner, 140. 
17 Ibid., 140. 
18 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by J. Macquarrie, E. Robinson (New York, 
NY: Harper & Row, 1962), 119/86. 
19 Ibid., 119/86. 
20 Ibid., 119/86. 
21 Dwayne Huebner, “New Modes of Man’s Relation to Man,” in The Lure of the 
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embracing scientific instrumentalism, it is primarily understood in terms of 
“abstraction and generalization.”22 Educational models emerging from social 
efficiency ideology view authentic learning in terms of the student’s ability to 
abstract “certain patterns of events from a specific situation or a series of like 
situations and transferring them to new situations.”23 This form of knowledge, 
according to Huebner, arises from the “imposition of a symbolic curtain or 
screen between the person or reality,”24 and knowledge of the world in this 
form, by means of abstract symbols and images, appears to give the human 
“more power in his encounter with and exploration of reality.”25 This 
represents for Heidegger the negative aspects associated with the privileging of 
scientific, or calculative knowledge, within our various modes of world-
disclosure, and as expressed by Young, “the more completely the world can be 
‘calculated’ the more completely it can be controlled,”26 and thus “far from 
being concerned to disclose the world in its ‘ownness,’ science is just another 
disclosure of it in the ‘work’ – suitable way, another disclosure of it as 
resource.”27 It is possible to understand the essence of Huebner’s critique of 
curriculum, learning, and knowledge by attending to what Heidegger states 
regarding the general relatedness of our thought to the sciences, which is 
determined by the “basic trait of the modern era,” namely, “that object-
materiality which is established and maintained in power by the scientific 
objectification in all fields.”28  
For Heidegger, this specific type of world-disclosure functions by way 
of objectifying and thematizing the world. As Heidegger indicates, when we 
approach entities in the world in terms of representing abstract scientific-
mathematical relationships, we reduce them to a mere present-at-hand existence, 
or as Heidegger states, “Being-just-present-at-hand-and-no-more,”29 and such 
entities have their “properties defined mathematically in ‘functional 
concepts’.”30 The implication of this for Huebner’s analysis of education is 
expressed succinctly in Dreyfus’ account of Heidegger’s notion of thematizing, 
wherein Dreyfus concludes that one problem with this view of knowledge is 
that  
 
once characteristics are no longer related to one another 
in a concrete, everyday, meaningful way, as aspects of a 
                                                 
22 Dwayne Hubner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 135.  
23 Ibid., 135. 
24 Huebner, “New Modes of Man’s Relation to Man,” 23. 
25 Dwayne Huebner, “Towards a Remaking of Curriculum Language,” in Heightened 
Consciousness, Cultural Revolution, and Curriculum Theory (Berkeley, CA: McCutchan Publishing 
Corporation, 1974), 38.  
26 Julian Young, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 77. 
27 Ibid., 77. 
28 Martin Heidegger,(1968) What is Called Thinking?, trans. by J. G. Gray, F. Wiecks 
(New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1968), 102.  
29 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 122/88. 
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thing in a particular context, the isolated properties that 
remain can be quantified and related by scientific laws 
and thus taken as evidence for theoretical entities.31  
 
Thus, we approach entities by means of knowledge in a way that 
stands beyond our authentic engagement with their Being, and the so-called 
“bare facts” of science isolate phenomena through the “special activity of 
selective seeing,” and thus in a duplicitous sense, “scientifically relevant ‘facts’ 
are not merely removed from their context by selective seeing; they are theory-
laden, i.e., recontextualized in a new projection.”32 When thematizing entities 
through scientific world-disclosure, as Heidegger points out, they are freed in 
order that we might “determine their character objectively, which means that 
we free them “in such a way that they can ‘throw themselves against’ a pure 
discovering – that is, that they can become “Objects’.”33 The production, 
through abstracted thought, of “isolated properties with no contextual 
meaning”34 provides us with a new, but “essentially meaningless, context for 
[present-at-hand] properties.”35 If education concerns itself primarily with a 
mode of learning that thematizes the content of its curriculum, and beyond, the 
understanding of the human being and its world, along with the things and 
subjects with which it deals, then it is sanctioning a form of knowing that gives 
rise to a limited understanding of things because it privileges a mode of 
disclosure that ignores the complexity and particularity of our practical and 
meaningful interaction with the world and those with whom we share it. As 
Huebner argues, when we approach the world and others “enclosed in the 
framework of the subject-object attitude,”36 we tend to view others as 
“essentially predictable, controllable,”37 as something to be “studied and 
known.”38 Learning grounded in abstract conceptualization, which is 
emphasized and favored by traditional curricular theorists and the concept-
empiricists in education, removes students from the context of their involved 
dwelling with others and obscures, or covers over, their individuality and 
Being. Against this view, Huebner argues that we should not seek to encounter 
others “in terms of abstractions and concepts,”39 rather we should meet and 
commune with others through face-to-face discourse. 
Inauthentic education is neither interactive nor generative, and is 
conceived by Huebner as acting upon the student who in turn learns, or is 
trained, to act upon the world because he has assimilated it in knowledge, and 
                                                 
31 Hubert Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division 
I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 81. 
32 Ibid., 81. 
33 Heidegger, Being and Time, 414/363. 
34 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, 81. 
35 Ibid., 81. 
36 Dwayne Huebner, “The Task of the Curricular Theorist,” in The Lure of the 
Transcendent: Collected Essays By Dwayne E, Huebner, 88. 
37 Ibid., 88. 
38 Ibid. 
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this “leads to the proposition that there is the individual and there is a world, 
and that the individual develops in such a way that he has power over the 
world or to act upon the world.”40 Huebner’s critique of concept-empiricism 
sets up a world picture that is Cartesian in nature, or dualistic, which Heidegger 
refers to as the impoverished Cartesian world, which is sharply contrasted by 
Heidegger with the world in its ontological-existential manifestation that is 
linked with the worldhood of Dasein. The Cartesian “world” is meant as an 
“ontical concept and signifies the totality of those entities which can be 
present-at-hand within the world”41 as objects situated in time-space. In this 
view we are subjects merely observing the world objectively and dispassionately 
refraining from interfering with the sense data we are receiving from the world 
for fear that our perceptions might lead to a distorted and inaccurate picture of 
reality. Legitimate knowledge is constructed from our ideas in an atomistic 
manner by means of establishing connections and relations between concepts 
to form an accurate view of (objective) reality.  
To view the world exclusively in this manner misses the crucial way in 
which world “functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being of those 
entities”42 with which educators and students are intimately involved. 
Knowledge, in this view, is really an interior phenomenon occurring in the 
closed consciousness of the individual. Ideas (representations) in the mind 
appear to “picture” external reality, and when there is an agreement between 
our mental representations and the objective world, it is said we have 
knowledge. This indicates that when we know the objective world, because we 
have systematized facts expressed through mathematical formulae or universal 
laws of science, as previously stated, we act as subjects who impose our wills 
(through knowledge) in order to command and manipulate the world. The 
epistemological and ontological problem that this worldview engenders for 
education revolves around the model for validating truth claims that it adopts, 
namely, the correspondence model of truth, or epistemological model for verifying 
knowledge, which is based on the logic of adaequatio intellectus et rei, or “the 
adequation of the intellect and the thing.”43 
Traditional Western philosophy, and by extension educational 
philosophy rooted in social efficiency, erroneously claims that “the ‘locus’ of truth 
is assertion (judgment),”44 and the “essence of truth lies in the ‘agreement’ of 
                                                 
40 Hubner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 136. 
41 Heidegger, Being and Time, 93/64. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., (translator’s note), 257/214. The learning experiences that accompany the era 
of standardized, “high stakes testing” in education represent instances where knowledge (and 
learning) is reduced to the correspondence model of truth. The student’s subjective knowledge is linked 
with the objective knowledge on the test in a way where it is determined to be either correct or 
incorrect. To assess reading comprehension or literacy based on state mandated tests embracing 
the Either/Or epistemological cluster, ignores any and all notions of hermeneutic and heuristic 
forms of meaning-making as a valid indicators of higher-level student understanding through 
knowledge construction and transfer. 
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the judgment with the object.”45 This misinterpretation of truth is prevalent 
today because of the influence of the metaphysics of presence, which Heidegger 
traces to the origins of ancient ontology, “the decisive period” when the “logos 
functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to that which authentically is, 
and for deciding the Being of such entities.”46  The notion of thematizing 
introduced earlier is precisely a way of “encountering entities in-the-world 
purely in the way they look (eidos),”47 and looking at the world in this manner “is 
sometimes a definite way of taking up a direction toward something – of 
setting our sights toward what is [merely] present-at-hand.”48 Truth conceived 
only in terms of agreement overlooks the more primordial phenomenon of 
truth as occurrence, or happening, the moment when phenomena are first 
disclosed to Dasein, for as Heidegger claims, “The most primordial phenomenon of 
truth is first shown by the existential-ontological foundations of uncovering.” 49 This for 
Heidegger represents the Being of truth, as “Being-true,” which is aletheuein, or 
movement into the opening of truth as aletheia – or privative expression 
meaning “un-concoveredness”. Dasein is always “in truth” due to its 
disclosedness in general, its projection towards its potentiality-for-Being, which 
means that “Dasein can understand itself in terms of the ‘world’ and Others or 
in terms of its ownmost potentiality-for-Being.”50 Heidegger claims that we are 
also in “untruth” due to falling, which is a component of Dasein’s Being that 
opens it to potential deception, for even in disclosure, things can “show 
themselves in the mode of semblance,” for there is always the possibility that 
what has “formally been uncovered sinks back again, hidden and disguised.”51  
The notion of primordial truth as aletheia avoids Cartesian dualism as it 
transcends objectivist-ontology by showing that there is no interior-exterior 
divide between the human and its world, for truth is not conceived at a 
physical-spatial remove from the human’s perspective, but rather a view to 
truth as openness to the letting be of beings and Being. We might imagine 
students and educators within the context of the world of their authentic 
learning as participating within the clearing and lighting of truth, in the open 
revelation of their potentiality-for-Being, or the unconcealment of beings, 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 257/214 
46 Ibid., 196/154. In “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth,” Heidegger details the decisive shift in 
Western metaphysics when truth as aletheia was subjugated to truth as “agreement” in his 
somewhat controversial reading of Plato’s allegory of the cave. See Fried for one such critical 
account of Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato and his metaphysical doctrine of truth: “Of 
course, Heidegger means by ‘doctrine’ (Lehre) ‘that which, within what is said, remains unsaid,’ 
rather than a self-conscious teaching of the thinker: in Plato’s cave, this is the transition of truth 
as aletheia from unconcealment (Unverborgenheir) to the correctness of representation […] many 
postmodernists who owe a debt of thinking to Heidegger have also accepted this reading of 
Plato […] But such a Plato is not the only Plato.” Greg Fried, “Back to the Cave: A Platonic 
Rejoinder to Heideggerian Postmodernism,” in Heidegger and the Greeks: Interpretive Essays 
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 157. 
47 Ibid., 196/154. 
48 Ibid., 88/61. 
49 Ibid., 264/221 
50 Ibid., 264/221. 
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which is never reducible to an existent state, for it is a happening, or occurrence. 
Truth as unconcealedness, as primordial aletheia, “is neither an attribute of 
factual things in the sense of beings, nor one of propositions.”52 In the midst 
of truth’s happening, “in the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs, 
There is a clearing, a lighting,”53 and by means of this open clearing aletheia 
“grants and guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we 
ourselves are not, and access to the being that we are ourselves are.”54 Truth as 
aletheia in fact makes possible truth as agreement, it is the primordial “condition 
of the possibility”55 of truth as correspondence. The understanding of truth as 
an original event presupposes that we are always already situated in the world, 
immersed within our existence. This dramatically influences the manner in 
which we understand and discourse about the world and others. To let the 
world be seen in its “unhiddenness” means that we let the world come to 
presence in the mode of its own self-showing, in ways that are meaningful to 
us. 
Huebner’s critique of learning in social efficiency ideology is linked directly 
to Heidegger’s interpretation of the Cartesian world of objects, for if we are 
perceiving the classroom in such impoverished terms, focusing only on the 
objective features of the things we deal with, their present-at-hand attributes, their 
abiding presence, educators are missing the fact that things and people always 
reveal themselves in a larger context, within a context of meaningful relations, 
which cannot be reduced to the knowledge of things available to us by way of 
thematizing the world. This represents a persistent problem for educators, 
namely, the loss of meaningful educational experiences for students: To focus 
on the ‘facts’ of our educational subject-matter, those aspects of curriculum 
that can be efficiently mastered and demonstrated through rigorous forms of 
examination, pays no heed to how the content is meaningful to the student’s 
Being or her world. The notion of authentic meaning in constructivist terms 
will be explored in the final section of the essay, for it underlies Huebner’s 
understanding of authentic learning, which is grounded in the human being’s 
authentic relation to its world. As Huebner suggests: 
 
The individual is not separated from the world, or apart 
from it – he is a part of it […] if a curricular language can 
be developed so that the educator looks at the individual 
or the situation together, not separately, then his powers 
of curricular design and educational responsibility might 
be increased.56  
 
                                                 
52 Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. by A. Hofstadter (London: Harper 
& Row, 1971), 54.  
53 Ibid., 54. 
54 Ibid., 53. 
55 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, 199 
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The Potential Implication of Authentic Learning for 
Education 
 
Inauthentic learning is concerned with knowledge that is both 
instrumental and of a distinct variety, namely, logical-rational-scientific, and 
education that lives in the shadow of positivism runs the ever-present risk of 
degenerating into a form of curriculum-making where technicalization and 
hyperrationalization dominate. The former focuses on the utility of our 
knowledge at the exclusion of the concern for meanings, for why we do things 
and why they are meaningful to us; the latter, favors the application of reason 
alone to our analyses of the world at the exclusion of the concern for the 
emotional and spiritual dimensions of our Being. Education in this view is 
reduced to students navigating the world of present-at-hand entities with the goal 
of mastering and controlling the environment and the things therein by means 
of the power they gain through acquiring objective knowledge. Not that 
educators should avoid experiences that focus on the empirically verifiable 
aspects of reality, but this form of learning-knowledge should not be privileged 
above all other ways of knowing, understanding, and intuiting the crucial 
dimensions of the student’s Being. Hermeneutic interpretive meaning-making 
should be an integral part of the learning experience in the classroom and 
educators should demonstrate a genuine concern for the general intangible 
aspects of the learner’s Being-in-the-world, which cannot be quantifiably measured 
or validated by means of the traditional epistemological model grounded in the 
differentiation between a priori-analytic and a posteriori-synthetic. 
Inauthentic learning situates the source of knowledge outside of the 
learner in the objective world. The types of inauthentic learning experiences 
that accompany the era of standardized, or “high-stakes testing,” in education 
are instances where objective knowledge is situated at a remove from the 
student, is then imparted to the student, for which the student is then 
responsible for identifying and recognizing on the test. If the student’s 
(subjective) knowledge is linked correctly with the objective knowledge on the 
test, she demonstrates knowledge. To assess reading comprehension or 
contribute to the determination of literacy based on a test privileging the 
Either/Or epistemological cluster (by means of employing the correspondence 
model of truth), ignores constructivist knowledge, or understanding, emerging 
from hermeneutic interpretation and meaning-making as strong indicators of 
higher-level understanding. This misses the more primordial aspects of learning 
through interpretive activities as process of uncovering Being, which is 
associated with the primordial revelation of truth, or the making-present of 
truth, as aletheia.  
Authentic education organizes learning experiences so as to encourage 
students to inhabit and interact with the world of the classroom in terms of 
being “open” to the world they encounter within the various activities that 
comprise their learning experience. Students should be encouraged to allow 
things to come to presence in truth, in the very light of their own self-showing, 
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for their Being. Educators should resolutely pursue the formation of students 
by letting them be, as it were, allowing their unique possibilities for Being to shine 
forth. The essence of truth, and hence knowledge and understanding, should 
not be thought of as residing in propositions, formulae, standardized tests, or 
other such vehicles for packaging, transmitting, and assessing the validity of 
truth, all of which express the correspondence between the internal 
representation (idea) of the subject and the existing (real) objective state-of-
affairs. Rather the essential way in which we are “in-truth” occurs through 
disclosure, as we are “there” in moments of authentic discovery, which is the 
occurrence of both students and educators actively uncovering their authentic 
possibilities as related to their Being within the authentic context of navigating 
solutions to the problems they encounter. 
 
Huebner, Heidegger, and Ecstatic Temporality 
 
There is yet a third aspect of Huebner’s critique of education emerging 
from his focus on objectivist-ontology and the epistemological reliance on 
logical-rational-scientific knowledge as the gold standard for learning, and that is 
his concern with transcending the inauthentic notion of temporality that 
accompanies these aforementioned educational philosophies, especially 
prevalent within the erroneous view wherein knowledge is thought to map 
both space and time. As Huebner points out, “Man abstracts from the 
processes of life as if his only meanings were in the spatial world not 
necessarily in the temporal,”57 and if this crucial issue is confused or ignored, 
namely, the undeniable spatial characteristics of knowledge, the educator is in danger 
of viewing and interacting with the world “as if it were relatively stable in 
time,”58 i.e., in an a-temporal and a-historical manner. Due to the 
misunderstanding of authentic temporality, contemporary curriculum 
philosophy erroneously conflates education theory, which is practical, with 
scientific theory, which describes, explains, and predicts, and so researchers 
wrongly view educational programs as having a direct, observable, and 
predictable application within classrooms. In distinction to this view, authentic 
educational theory attempts to suggest what we ought to be doing in the 
classroom, and as opposed to objective and disinterested, according to 
Huebner, it is unabashedly subjective, value-laden, and emancipatory. Huebner, 
taking up Heidegger’s interpretation of “ecstatic temporality,” claims that we 
need to embrace the view of time in which we embody our past, as heritage, 
and stand out in projection toward an indeterminate future, which returns to 
meet us in the authentic present when our authentic possibilities are opened 
for appropriation. Huebner’s authentic understanding of time in its relation to 
curriculum studies challenges the vision, design, and implementation of the 
curriculum in contemporary education, which is erroneously conceived in 
terms of a linear understanding of time. 
                                                 
57 Huebner, “Towards a Remaking of Curriculum Language,” 39.  




J. MAGRINI     135 
 Huebner links temporality with historicality in terms of Heidegger’s 
understanding of Dasein’s authentic comportment in the moment of vision, 
and thus a brief overview of the process of Dasein’s temporalizing, in addition to 
a few words about time as conceived by Heidegger, will assist the 
understanding of Huebner’s individual-world dialectic, which provides the design of 
the classroom’s temporal-historical environment. Huebner’s strives to overcome 
the erroneous conception of the student as an ahistorical subject situated 
within a linear conception of time conceived as a series of “now” points, 
unfolding in three the distinct moments of past, present and future. In this 
view of time, as Heidegger argues, past and future are subordinated to the 
present, the “nun [now] is the metron [measure] of past and future,”59 and as a 
result “time is always interpreted as present, past is interpreted as no longer 
present, future as independent not-yet-present.”60 Importantly, this leads to an 
inauthentic view of our historical evolution and development, for in it the 
dynamic unfolding of our authentic historizing is reduced to an inauthentic view 
wherein history is conceived in terms of “historiography,” or the scientific 
discipline that studies past events, cultures, and their artifacts.  
According to Heidegger, history, as “historiography,” is concerned 
with those things once present, now forever gone, and so the past is conceived 
as belonging “irretrievably to another earlier time.”61 This idea is linked to the 
understanding of human history in terms of a series of irretrievable events or 
moments. This engenders an inauthentic understanding of the significance of 
the past in relation to Dasein’s future and present, and arises as a result of its 
falling and its absorption in the “They-self” and the everyday ways of 
understanding its existence, and “allows what has passed to be only in the past, 
which lets it freeze in the finality of [its] rigor mortis.”62 The interpretation of 
time as a linear phenomenon covers over the ontological-existential 
significance of Dasein’s death, birth, and heritage, as thrown having-been  – it’s 
authentic life. According to Heidegger, history happens in praxis in terms of 
Dasein’s historicality, which is the living event of Daein’s freedom in relation 
to its past in the projection of its authentic possibilities, which arise from its 
past as heritage. Historicality, according to Huebner, as it relates specifically to 
curriculum development in education, is associated with practice, and in his 
view, 
 
practice as human event suggests the essentially temporal 
nature of man and points to the linkage of biography to 
history as a major educational concern. Curriculuralists 
have ignored such questions of destiny, finitude, and the 
                                                 
59 Martin Heidegger, The Concept of Time, trans. by William McNeill (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing. 1992), 17e.  
60 Ibid., 17e.  
61 Heidegger, Being and Time, 430/378. 
62  Martin Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, trans. by John Gray (New York, NY: 
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meaning of morality of the influence of one human being 
on another. 63 
 
Huebner argues that the traditionalists and concept-empiricists in 
curriculum theory are either concerned with establishing goals, purposes, and 
objectives, which orient learning exclusively toward the future, with the specific 
task of determining the student’s “future behavior,” or they are locked within 
the static moment of the present, which leads to the failure to understand the 
potential for change and to realize that “human life is never fixed but is always 
emergent as the past and future become horizons of the present.”64 Heidegger 
traces the loss of Dasein’s authentic temporal Being to the inauthentic, 
everyday interpretation of existence in which Dasein “temporalizes itself in the 
mode of making-present,”65 and by locating itself in the hypostatized moment 
of the present (or “now”), Dasein “loses his time”66 because it fails to await the 
approach of the authentic future from out of its past, heritage, or having-been. 
This also represents the loss of Being, which emerges from a misunderstanding 
of Being as being present, i.e., the event of Being is conceived as “pure presence, 
that is, the presence that persists, the abiding present, the steadily standing 
‘now’.”67 This inauthentic interpretation of Being is linked inextricably with 
temporality, and it erroneously views beings as standing outside of time, as 
independent of time, and subsequently, this view of time “sees time in the 
sense of a passing away.”68 Rather, an authentic temporal existence, states 
Huebner, remaining close to Heidegger’s notion of ecstatic temporality as it is 
linked with historicality, requires “inspection of the past (or the present as the 
already-past),” 69  along with the “identification of forms of existence or aspects 
of life considered worthy of maintenance, transmission, or necessary for 
evolution; and the projection of these valued forms into the future.”70  
Huebner expresses succinctly the inauthentic interpretation of time 
when stating the following: “Man, has constructed his scientific view of time as 
something objective and beyond himself, in which he lives.”71 Such a view is 
opposed to the manner in which Heidegger views Dasein’s authentic 
relationship to time, for as he states, “Dasein conceived in its most extreme 
possibility of Being is time itself and not in time.”72 Time is not objective, for the 
duration or length of time cannot be measured scientifically by way of 
mathematical symbols, for time has no length. While mathematical-scientific 
knowledge accurately measures the medium of space, it is powerless to 
calculate, gauge, and represent the non-spatial medium of time, with its 
                                                 
63 Huebner, “Knowledge: An Instrument of Man,” 225. 
64 Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 132-133. 
65 Heidegger, Being and Time, 436/410. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Heidegger, What is called Thinking? 102.  
68 Ibid., 103 
69 Huebner, “Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 132. 
70 Ibid., 137. 
71 Ibid., 137. 
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dynamic flux and flow. The future does not rush toward us as we stand in the 
present moment, only to disappear forever into the irretrievable void of the 
past. In addition, time is not linear, and neither the wall-cock nor wristwatch 
properly presents time, and according to Heidegger, by treating time as a 
quantitative phenomenon, measurable in length, in its extension, the clock 
attempts to show us “what” time is, but misses the more substantial 
ontological-existential matter of how time is, which is to say, the way in which we 
enact our time when living as temporal, existential beings. 
 Our humanity, or ontological self-hood, is inextricably 
grounded in ecstatic temporality, wherein past, present, and future are united, 
indivisible, perpetually working in concert within the moment of our present. 
This moment of the present is the authentic moment of vision, i.e., the 
revelation of truth and subsequent appropriation of our authentic Being-in-the-
world. It is not “present” in terms of a point that is situated between future 
and past. It is the moment in which the world, beings, and entities reveal 
themselves in ways that matter within the “there,” or disclosedness, of Dasein. 
As Heidegger states, this moment of vision is possible due to the convergence 
of past and future, and this suggests that the past circles round to meet us, “the 
coming [Kunft] in which Dasein, in its ownmost potentiality-for-being, comes 
toward itself,”73 from out of the indeterminate future, and thus the past is 
never legitimately gone. The fact that we have a past cannot be overlooked or 
skirted, as it represents our being thrown into the world in a specific and 
unique manner. However, the past acquires meaning only when we 
authentically project it into the future, and when “authentically futural, Dasein 
is authentically as ‘having-been,’ as its own thrown past.”74  
Authenticity represents our “most extreme possibility of Being,” 75 it is a life 
in praxis, a temporal process of taking over our existence through interpretive 
decision-making, whereby we legitimize our thrown-past (having-been) in the 
service of making (and re-making) our future Being. Dasein’s authentic 
Selfhood is only to be found in the “authentic-potentiality-for-being-one’s-self 
– that is to say, in the authenticity of Dasein’s Being as care.”76 For Heidegger, 
the “primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality”77 and this 
relates to the Being of Dasein as “Care,” which embodies the three moments, 
or horizons, of ecstatic temporality: (1) we are always out-ahead-of-ourselves in 
the projection of a future, (2) we are always along side both things and Others 
in the world, and (3) we are always already in the world as a thrown, living 
being, as someone with a past, a history and heritage. When considering such a 
model of temporality, of which “clock time” is merely derivative, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that the past, which constitutes our living history and heritage, is 
sewn into the very fabric of our Being. The past is continually at work 
                                                 
73 Heidegger, Being and Time, 373/326. 
74 Ibid.. 
75 Heidegger, The Concept of Time, 10e. 
76 Heidegger, Being and Time, 369/322. 
77 Martin Heidegger The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. by Michael Heim 
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influencing and shaping the moment of vision through its ever-attendant 
presence. The past serves as the source of our historical life and future; it allows 
us to redefine our existence by making choices on the possibilities that emerge 
from our heritage, which is at once the historical ground of our existence. 
It is possible to grasp ecstatic temporality in the following manner: In the 
moment of resolute openness (Entschlossenheit), the mood of Angst individuates 
Dasein for its death and ownmost possibilities for Being, opening what 
Heidegger terms, the “Situation,” or the authentic way of “Being-there”. 
Conceived as a temporal phenomenon, the Situation is Dasein’s moment of 
vision or instant of authenticity. “In the instant as an ecstases,” writes 
Heidegger, “the existent Dasein is carried away, as resolved, into the factically 
determined possibilities, circumstances, contingencies of the situation of 
action.”78 This is the authentic present of ecstatic temporality, when Dasein, 
accessible and free, projects itself into its possibilities within the factical and 
distinct circumstances of its own unique life. Such an authentic resolute 
openness to worldly encounters is only possible because Dasein, as a temporal 
being that temporalizes, is at once its future, past, and present as thrown-projecting 
Being-in-the-world.  
The present, which is held within authentic temporality, is the 
sustaining form of Dasein’s authentic choices, representing the “resolute 
rapture with which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and 
circumstances are encountered in the Situation as possible objects of 
concern.”79 The authentic temporalizing of Dasein occurs as it projects its finite 
possibilities, which initiates a forward movement towards itself as resolute 
Being-towards-death in its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, and this movement 
secures a “repetition,” or authentic retrieval, of Dasein’s having-been. In 
coming to or toward itself, from out of its indeterminate future, as engendered 
by its own past, Dasein discloses the meaning of authentic Being within the 
instant of the present, or moment of vision (Augenblick),80 of the Situation. This 
ecstatic temporal process represents the letting be of Being, which represents the 
authentic truth of existence. Thus, when Dasein exists authentically, it 
experiences the world in its basic “uconcealment” – allowing that which shows itself 
from itself to be seen – now not disclosing beings as present-at-hand entities, or 
objects, but the phenomenon of world as such, the worldhood of the world, i.e., 
the overarching matrix of meaning and purpose structuring Dasein’s being-in-
the-world, which understanding and interpretation have in great part made 
possible for Dasein.81 The process of temporalizing, as described above, will be 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 297. 
79 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, 287. 
80 McNeill translates Augenblick as “the glance of the eye,” and prefers this translation 
to moment, moment of vision, or enpresenting. He writes that the German employed by Heidegger 
”carries both a visual and temporal sense, conveying the momentary ‘character’ of seeing.” In 
line with Huebner’s rendering of Augenblick, I have retained, “moment of vision.” William 
McNeill, The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2000), ixx.  
81 Huebner describes the process of temporalizing in similar, albeit not identical terms, 
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further developed as an authentic historical occurrence in the final section of 
the essay when analyzing Huebner’s individual-world dialectic. 
 
The Potential Implication of Ecstatic Temporality for 
Education 
 
Due to an inauthentic understanding of time, educators orient the 
curriculum and the learning experience contained therein toward the future, 
which is conceived as knowable and determinate, creating an education 
program wherein goals, aims, and purposes are posited in advance of the 
authentic experience of education in its practical enactment, and toward which 
students are then led. Such a strict product-process model for curriculum assumes 
that it can specify the student’s future behavior because it is determinate and 
thus predictable. In many instances, the student’s authentic possibilities are 
defined in advance by educational professionals residing at an external and 
temporal remove from the authentic unfolding of the student’s Being in the 
processes of learning. For example, private foundations (Carnegie Corporation) 
and accrediting testing agencies (ETS – Education Testing Service), situated at 
a remove from the classroom, represent professional organizations that are in 
charge of establishing the standards criteria for learning within educational 
institutions. This expression of the inauthentic understanding of time covers 
over and obscures the student’s genuine potentiality-for-Being. Whereas the 
authentic understanding of temporality makes possible moments of resolute 
openness wherein students choose to enact their authentic possibilities within a 
learning environment facilitating the autonomous and self-directed revelation 
and appropriation of their authentic possibilities for the enactment of their 
Being.  
  Due to the inauthentic understanding of time, it is also possible for 
educators to remain locked within a view to the present, which presupposes an 
understanding of time where the past is gone and irretrievable and the future 
has not yet arrived. This represents a form of presentism in education, i.e., the 
current conception and inception of educational systems, institutions, 
philosophies, and theories are conceived as existing “in time,” and since they 
                                                                                                                  
having-been that makes possible the projection of his potentiality. The present is the moment of 
vision where Dasein, finding itself thrown into a situation (the past), projects its on potentiality 
for being. Human life is not futural (my emphasis); nor is it past, but, rather, a present made up of a 
past and future brought into the moment.” It must be noted that while Huebner certainly 
remains very close to Heidegger’s original interpretation of ecstatic temporality, the remark 
stating that we are not futural beings is inconsistent with what Heidegger indicates regarding the 
primacy of the future ecstases in the care-structure and the authentic temporalizing of Dasein, for 
the “future (ecstases) has a priority in the ecstatical unity of primordial and authentic temporality.” 
Heidegger claims that although all modes of temporality are equiprimordial, their “modes of 
temporalizing are different,” and to understand “primordial and authentic temporality” we must 
note that it “temoralizes itself in terms of the authentic future and in such a way that in having 
been futurally, it first of all awakens the Present. The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic 
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are viewed only through the lens of the present, as making-present, they assume 
eternal, indelible, and hypostatic characteristics, making the possibility for 
authentic educational reform not only a daunting task, but a fatalistic 
impossibility. This view of time remains blind to the crucial role that the past 
plays, as heritage, in the historizing process of the student, which represents her 
unique potentiality-for-Being as related her living past (and not merely a 
historical past), which is always alive with the potential for growth and 
transcendence, and is taken up into the authentic leaning experience, which is 
the convergence of past and future in the moment of vision.  
There are also models for curriculum-making that are situated in the present 
while demonstrating an unquestioned reverence for the past and its educational 
traditions, where change is viewed in terms of superficial improvements to a 
grounding, foundational form that essentially remains unchallenged and 
unchanged. These philosophies of education have firm roots in the thought of 
the past and present. When conceiving an essential education for students, in 
terms of a perennial or permanent curriculum, they are really imitating the past, 
aping the past, recreating the past in the present without attempting to reassess 
or reinterpret it in light of the students’ needs and wants, in terms of their 
unique and futural potential-for-Being. This inauthentic view of education 
embraces the status quo in curriculum, its content, pedagogical methodology, 
and assessment strategies, and in no way represents the emancipatory move 
beyond the current manner in which students, education, and society are 
conceived. 
 
Authentic Education and the Individual-World Dialectic: 
Navigating the World as Temporal-Historical Being-in-the-
World as Being-with Others 
 
Huebner’s concern with temporality is more complex than simply the 
issue of educators, who are designing and implementing curriculum, 
demonstrating a concern for the unfolding of time, or taking an interest in 
history as a dynamic process, for these are concerns for historicist critique, and 
this, of course, is not what Huebner is engaged in. Rather, on a primordial and 
ontological level, Huebner is concerned with how we enact our authentic 
existence in terms of the authentic unfolding of our historical being, and 
beyond, he is concerned with how thinking education might be enhanced when 
informed by the types of ontological-existential issues that are bound up with 
the authentic enactment of students’/educators’ Being-in-the-world. According 
to Huebner, “Curricular practice is not simply the concern for the constellation 
of the educative environment,” it is the “concern for the human events that 
occur within that environment.”82 To fully grasp the significance of the 
individual-world dialectic, Huebner’s notion of educational “practice” must be 
elucidated in terms of practical human activity, which dynamically embodies 
the “essential temporal nature of man and points to the linkage of biography to 
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history as a major educational concern.”83 Ultimately, it is Huebner’s notion of 
the individual-world dialectic that serves as the organizing philosophical force for 
reconceived curriculum design as inspired by thinking ecstatic temporality in 
relation to education. Analyzing the individual-world dialectic will reveal the 
kinship between Huebner’s philosophy of education and Heidegger’s thinking 
on Dasein’s authentic historicality. Unpacking the following quotation by 
Huebner reveals that Huebner’s individual-world dialectic springs from the 
founding ground of Heidegger’s thinking on the basic constitution of 
historicality, which includes, as I show, the notions of heritage, fate, and destiny as 
related to our authentic historizing as communal beings.  
 
The springs or sources of temporality do not reside in the 
individual, but in conjunction between the individual and 
other individuals, their material objects, and other ways of 
thinking as they are objectified in symbol and operation. 
Furthermore these springs or sources, although again not 
residing in society, are nevertheless unveiled, maintained, 
and protected by society. Thus man shapes the world, but 
the world also shapes man. This is the dialectic process in 
which cause is effect, and effect is cause. The world calls 
forth new responses from the individual, who in turn calls 
forth new responses from the world.84  
 
I begin the analysis by clarifying Huebner’s notion of authentic 
learning, which as opposed to learning grounded in abstraction and 
generalization is a more primordial form of knowledge, or better, 
understanding, through which students and educators interpret the world in 
meaningful ways. Authentic learning for both Huebner and Heidegger 
represents acts of understanding, and this form of insight, which is refined through 
interpretation, will provide insight into the relational character of human 
existence in terms of Huebner’s understanding of the individual-world dialectic, 
which is at once the temporal-historical happening of our Being, comprising 
the totality of the environmental design of the curriculum. For Heidegger, 
understanding is know-how, by means of which we navigate our world, and 
projection, or the manner in which Dasein, in its understanding, is always 
already-out-ahead (ecstatic ‘standing-out’) of itself in its futural projection. 
Dreyfus explains that understanding as know-how “makes possible skillful 
coping,”85 and “relates some activities as doable, as making sense, and others as 
not, or better, it does not recognize these other possibilities as possibilities at 
all.”86 Understanding is directed toward accomplishing one or another task or 
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84 Huebner, “Curriculum as a Concern for Man’s Temporality,” 138.  
85 Dreyfus, Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I, 184-
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activity, “coping with the available proceeds by pressing into possibilities,”87 
and the manner in which Dasein’s “coping is organized by a for-the-sake-of-
which,”88 and this for Heidegger is projection. Projection, it must be noted, is 
always bound up with the entities with which Dasein deals, which of course 
includes others, in terms of understanding and possibilities.  
As stated, ‘know-how,’ as understanding for Huebner, is linked with 
doing something with our understanding, but as opposed to the functional efficacy 
of either pragmatic or scientific knowledge of the world, Huebner views 
understanding as akin to existential thought, meditative thought, where doing 
something with understanding might include “new exploring, more satisfying 
expression, deeper and more meaningful encounters with others, greater 
awareness of what and who [we are], and more ability to build and transform 
the world.”89 Understanding, for both Huebner and Heidegger, is therefore 
sharply contrasted with knowing as thematizing, for understanding “is not 
cognition at all in the sense of grasping something thematically.”90 Rather, it is 
linked to the “Being of the ‘there’ [of Dasein’s disclosedness],” and is 
“primordially existential, it means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-
Being for the sake of which Dasein exists.”91 Through understanding Dasein 
projects its for-the-sake-of-which, when it is open to futural possibilities that are on 
the approach, which acquire meaning only in relation to the significance of the 
structure of the for-the-sake-of-which, the towards-this, and the in-order-to of the 
authentic “worldhood of its current world.”92 However, this for-the-sake-of-which is 
not a determinative goal or end that Dasein posits in advance of its activities, 
rather it is a way of understanding the meaning-schemata of Dasein’s Being-in-
the-world, where it “throws before itself the possibility as possibility and lets it 
be as such.”93 The system of relations Heidegger describes pertains to Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world as a whole. As related specifically to the process of 
education envisioned by Huebner, the for-the-sake-of-which of learning represents 
the groundless, or shifting, ground of the authentic curriculum, where 
educational aims for student achievement are imminent within and emerge 
from the unfolding of the learning. It must be noted that the for-the-sake-of-which 
of education functions in terms of being projected within a community of 
learners, for no student can ever have self-knowledge or authentic knowledge 
of her world at a remove from interpersonal contact. Heidegger is clear on this 
matter when writing, “The world of Dasein is a world-with [Mitwelt]. Being-in 
is Being-with-others. Their Being-in-themselves-within-the-world is Dasein 
with [Mitdasein].”94  
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Interpretation for Heidegger, works to clarify what is ambiguously 
given in understanding, and is never a “presuppositionless apprehending” of 
things, rather all of our interpretations begin as something, in terms of Dasein’s 
fore-having, fore-sight, and for-conception.95 We approach the things themselves, 
guided in the first instance by both their uniqueness as well as a preconception 
of what they might be, seeking to clarify our initial veiled and unclear 
conceptions of them in order to eventually deepen and solidify our 
understanding of them. This is accomplished through hermeneutic 
interpretation, where our pre-understanding of things, as it were, allows us to 
step into the circle, or spiral, of interpretation. When things, in relation to our 
Being are understood, “we say that they have meaning [Sinn].”96 As we work to 
clarify our understanding through interpretation we produce or construct 
meaning, and as Heidegger claims, meaning represents “the ‘upon which’ of a 
projection in terms of which something becomes interrogated as something; it 
gets its structure from a fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception.”97 This 
form of making-meaning is precisely what Huebner has in mind when he talks of 
hermeneutic activity as central to the dialectic between individuals, their 
history, and world in terms of a confrontation, which he describes as the 
rhythmic continuity and change of the individual’s understanding and 
involvement with her world. For Huebner, hermeneutical activity is a 
communal art, a “way of getting at pedagogical method and interpreting what 
goes on in the classroom or other educational places.”98 Interpretation, as an 
ongoing process, is always at work in education, and “whether by asking 
questions, establishing written assignments, reading to the child, or 
pronouncing words for him,” educators are “introducing him to traditions of 
interpretations.”99  
Huebner claims that the educational environment embodying “the 
dialectical forms valued by society would require three aspects or 
components.”100 It is possible to understand the three aspects of the individual-
world dialectic transpiring within education, guided and directed by the design of 
the curriculum, in terms of Heidegger’s understanding of authentic historicality 
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and the notions of heritage, fate, and destiny, the invariant structures that ground 
Dasein’s historicizing, all of which correspond to the human’s temporal Being as 
“Care”. Authentic education shows a concern for both the evolution of the 
human being as well as the community, and Huebner envisions education as 
the “manifestation of the historical process, meshing the unfolding biography 
of the individual within the unfolding history of his society.”101 Huebner claims 
that the ideal learning environment represents the unfolding of human 
temporality as historicality through hermeneutic interpretation, and is an 
environment that (1) calls forth a response from the student, (2) is reactive, and (3) 
makes possible authentic moments of vision, “when the student and/or those 
responsible him, project his potentiality-for-Being into the present, thus tying 
together the future and the past into the present.”102 The educative process 
conceived by Huebner should be understood in terms of Heidegger’s thinking 
on Dasein’s resolute historical existence, where “resoluteness implies handing 
oneself down by anticipation to the ‘there’ of the moment of vision; and this 
handing down we call ‘fate’. This is also the ground for destiny, by which we 
understand Dasein’s historizing in Being-with Others.”103 
The curriculum as conceived by Huebner represents the authentic 
dwelling of students and educators in the midst of a living tradition, wherein 
they consider questions about what is valued, what traditions should be 
preserved or altered, what should remain as part of the collective memory now 
and in the future. This is not simply about teaching students about our past 
and its traditions, not simply about deciding what knowledge from our past is 
most valuable and therefore should be learned and passed along. Rather, 
authentic education represents a collective decision about what aspects of our 
tradition, or collective ethos, are in fact worthy to be taken up in “repetition” 
and projected, as authentic possibility, into the future as destiny. In order to call 
forth responses from students the living aspects of our heritage must be 
embraced, they must be recognized as forming our authentic past, for in such a 
view our heritage alone is worthy enough to demand and warrant a response, a 
rejoinder that takes seriously the responsibility we have to our own unique 
potentiality-for-Being. It is interesting to note that in Heidegger’s analysis of 
authenticity, in terms of resolute, individuated Dasein’s Being-towards-death, 
he refrains from including a discussion about the explicit factical possibilities 
that are made available to the resolute Dasein for comportment. In fact, 
Heidegger stresses that such an investigation “excludes even the existential 
projection of the factical possibilities of existence,” and so he considers where 
“in general Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects 
itself,”104 for projecting itself on the possibility of death alone as possibility, 
“gives only the totality and authenticity of one’s resoluteness.”105 It is in fact 
from the past, as heritage, that Dasein’s factical possibilities, in terms of its 
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potentiality-for-Being, first arise, representing the so-called “content” of 
authentic existence to which form is provided by Dasein through the 
autonomous enactment of its historical Being.  
 
The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, 
discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, 
and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that 
resoluteness, as thrown, takes over […] if everything 
‘good’ is a heritage, and the character of ‘goodness’ lies in 
making authentic existence possible, then the handing 
down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness.106  
 
Heritage, as authentic thrown having-been, is what demands a rejoinder 
from Dasein, and Huebner refers to heritage as the students’ “collective 
wealth,” and represent speech patterns, forms of dialogue, language of the 
curriculum, structural forms of various disciplines, and our collective ethos, the 
habituated behaviors and beliefs of a historical culture, along with “the social 
customs shaping interacting patterns, and the man-made things that make up 
much of the man’s world.”107 Within these aspects of heritage “we find the 
stuff for our hermeneutic and world-building arts”108 and they inform the fore-
having, fore-sight, and fore-conception that the student brings to the context of 
interpretation, wherein memories of their collective existence are set within a 
“caring collectivity in which individuals share memories and intentions,”109 and 
through the process of learning, “form a bridge between self and other; a 
linkage among past, present, and future; the vehicle by which individuals, in 
community, arrive at mutual understanding in the conduct of their public 
affairs.”110 The past becomes the means by which students project their own 
potentiality-for-Being as historical, and the educational environment must be 
designed with the understanding that the past is always present as the basis for 
our futural projection. This relates to what Heidegger claims about heritage and 
“the possibility that Dasein might choose its hero”111 from out of the myriad of 
historical possibilities that the past has made available for potential 
appropriation. “For this,” as Inwood writes, “Dasein must return to the past, 
perhaps to its own birth, but more likely beyond. There are great philosophers, 
generals, statesmen, artists, saints, and lovers whose deeds and works are part 
of Dasein’s heritage.”112  
 In addition to calling forth a response from students, the educational 
environment “must be reactive, or else the student must question it so that it 
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responds to him.”113 This relates directly to the unique possibilities that 
manifest in a way in which our “accidental” and “provisional” possibilities are 
“driven out” and our existence is pushed into its “finitude,” and at that instant, 
we are “snatched back from the endless multiplicity of possibilities which offer 
themselves as closest,” and this brings us “into the simplicity of [our] fate 
(Schicksal).”114 Dasein is aware of enacting only a limited number of 
possibilities, and it understands that these possibilities are approaching from 
out of the past as its living heritage. Fate, according to Heidegger, is 
determinative of Dasein’s futural projection and the authentically “historical” 
moment of vision. Fate is the manner in which Dasein opens the present, 
enacting its existence temporally as it experiences its freedom towards its 
authentic possibilities, and freedom arises from the limitations and finitude of 
its existence, and is in turn defined by the burden of its heritage. Fate is the how 
of comportment, the authentic enactment of Dasein’s existence as thrown-
projection, as it draws possibilities from its heritage and in a decisive manner 
chooses among the possibilities afforded by its past, and this is the reactive 
aspect of the learning space. “Fate is the authentic resoluteness in which 
Dasein holds itself free for death, in a possibility it has inherited and yet 
chosen.”115 This is what Heidegger means by stating that our finite possibilities 
are always drawn from heritage, and in terms of Huebner’s understanding of 
the individual-world dialectic, it is the recognition that this reactive aspect of the 
learning experience happens in terms of the reciprocal counter-striving 
between the student and her world, for as indicated earlier by Huebner, the 
student shapes the world and the world in turn shapes the student. This occurs 
only within a curriculum design acknowledging temporality and historicality, 
because the reactive aspect of authentic education hinges on the emergence of 
the “past as part of the valued past brought into the present of the student.”116  
 Educators must facilitate the emergence and occurrence of moments of 
vision, wherein student’s authentic possibilities for their Being manifest; they 
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must work with students in order to ready them, in moments of resolute 
openness, to enact their authentic possibilities, moments where the 
indeterminate future approaches to converge with their past, which is carried 
into, thereby breaking open, the authentic present of the Situation, “thus tying 
together the future and past in the present.”117 In light of the ground covered, 
it is possible to conclude that an authentic education as conceived by Huebner 
is one in which the design of the curriculum fosters the individual-world dialectic, 
which unfolds by means of hermeneutic meaning-making, informed by the 
student’s authentic potential-for-Being. Authentic education makes possible 
the emergence of the student’s authentic possibilities for establishing her 
historical grounding as destiny in the moment of vision; Through appropriation 
she enacts her authentic way of being-in-the-world as Being-with Others. The 
classroom is never merely a collection of individual and disconnected fates, as 
it is guided in advance by the fact that human existence is authentically 
communal. Rather, the classroom is a place of dwelling wherein “our fates have 
already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same 
world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities.”118  The design of the 
classroom environment within an authentic view to education sets up the 
solicitous context 
 
where adults seek to influence the young, where the 
young influence the adults, a place where the past is 
presently used, interpreted, rethought, and reworked; a 
place of not submitting to someone else’s powers and 
accustomed ways but of negotiating for power in the 
maintaining and reforming of the public world.119  
 
Destiny, within the individual-world dialectic, must be conceived as the 
ecumenical pursuit of authentic learning where the classroom represents an 
originary community, wherein we dwell in learning with others. In this community, 
students are beholden to the processes of education, as “each individual is 
bound up in advance to something that binds and determines each individual 
by exceeding them,”120 and this occurs within an atmosphere of solicitous care 
that unfolds through the process of interpretive meaning-making. Here, 
student and educator care for the communal archive of knowledge that is 
developing within various learning experiences, which is bound up with care 
for the both the student’s store of knowledge and unique cultural heritage as 
related to the her own unique possibility for existence, which grows and 
evolves within the flux, flow, and rhythmic dynamic of the unfolding of 
education as a temporal-historical phenomenon. When learning authentically 
with others, we share a like-minded sense of care for our common fate as 
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learners. Destiny is the authentic enactment of our potentiality-for-Being as 
historical, when through communication and struggle we make and remake our 
world as a people, and it culminates in the repetition (Wiederholen), or 
appropriation, of a possibility from our past in a reinterpreted and renewed 
form, and it is only in the moment of vision that this authentic appropriation 
of our past is possible.  
Repetition might be thought of as a dialogue with the past, or as 
Inwood suggests that we commit to a discourse with the past and its heroes, 
e.g., “Alexander or Plato makes certain suggestions”121 to us through their 
exploits or written words, and we “make a rejoinder to them.”122 Ultimately, 
through communal discourse as hermeneutic interpretation, repetition becomes 
a legitimate possibility of our Being, and through developing and deepening 
our interpretations of the world, which emerge through a confrontation with 
the past and past-as-present, we are in the position to authentically choose to 
choose ourselves through communal decision-making. Although we are beholden 
to our past this does not necessarily require that we honor or maintain it, 
further still it is not simply learning or memorizing our traditions, for this 
would be inauthentic confrontation with the past. Rather, we are only truly 
beholden to our heritage when we approach the past in order to see, 
understand, and beyond, envision ways in which it might be reinterpreted in 
light of our authentic potentiality-for-Being and taken up, through “repetition” 
in an authentic mode of historical appropriation, which both Heidegger and 
Huebner understand in terms of the human being’s authentic enactment of its 
history through the process of historizing. 
As this foregoing section indicates, Huebner’s philosophy of 
curriculum is both phenomenological and ontological, and since it is 
interpretive, it is also, in the tradition of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology of 
Being and Time, hermeneutic. The relevance of Huebner’s introduction of 
phenomenology in education and curriculum studies as related to 
contemporary Heidegger scholarship in education can be traced to the 
philosophical development of such major educational theorists as Smith, Van 
Manen, and most particularly, David Jardine, whose writings focus on 
educational reform in terms of qualitative philosophical inquiry, which runs 
counter to empirical and social research in education and pedagogy Much of 
contemporary research, according to Jardine, views education as a practice 
wherein the privilege of theory and method reduce the student’s authentic 
(“lived”) social situation to “univocal terms that can be simply counted and 
recounted,”123 whereas authentic interpretative research, as related specifically 
to the hermeneutical project that we find in Huebner, attempts to tease out, 
interpret, and understand the intangible “evocative given in all its tangled 
ambiguity, to follow its evocations and entrails of sense and significance that 
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are wound up with it.”124 Thus, education cannot be authentically conceived as 
reducible to a strict methodology or “set of rules that need to be simply applied 
to an incident independently of the contribution that incident might have 
regarding what needs to be said”125 in light of the practical conditions of the 
lived experience of education, which proximally and for the most part, 
structure and guide the interpretation’s unfolding.   
Importantly, as related to Huebner’s invaluable contribution to 
Heidegger studies in education, I have intimated within this paper a recent and 
emerging theoretical framework for research within contemporary educational 
scholarship in the post-structural movement to re-conceptualize the curriculum, 
which harbors a wealth of untapped potential, namely, the understanding of 
Being-in-the-world as unfolding through the attuned practice of “embodied” 
interpretation, understanding, and discourse as related to the life-practice of 
hermeneutics, or the “hermeneutics of facticity”.  In Being and Time Heidegger 
conceives the human being as it is always and already located within the world 
in a “factical” manner: “Facticity,” as Heidegger reasons, “is a definite way of 
Being,”126 and this implies that “an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-
world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ 
with the Being of those entities which it uncovers within the world.”127 
Heidegger’s foregoing description of “facticity,” as employed within Jardine’s 
qualitative work on education, as it is filtered through Huebner’s philosophy of 
curriculum, suggests that the philosophy of education and the interpretation 
thereof must above all be performative: It must be lived and practiced in actions 
that are inseparable from the embodied, lived events within which our 
experiences of the world and others are inextricably grounded.  
A philosophy as outlined embracing the “factical” unfolding of 
education as a practical immersion in the world, located within specific settings, 
bound up intimately with unique individuals, understands in advance that these 
concrete situations of learning cannot be grasped or communicated exclusively 
through rational, or calculative (“theoretical”) forms of knowing, for their 
existential “truths” are beyond the purview of both analytic and empirical 
thought. Thus, contemporary educational research should show concern for 
the living process of education as a “kind of illuminating disclosing of life in 
the explicit actualization [Vollzug] of the movement of factical life.”128 In 
Risser’s analysis of the relationship between the hermeneutics of facticity and the 
human community, his philosophical claims might be related directly to 
Huebner’s authentic understanding of education as described in this essay. 
Contemporary educational research would do well to “take its departure from 
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factical life experience and always turn back to factical life experience,”129 and 
avoid practices that the attempt to transcend lived, factical experience through 
objective, abstract generalizations of students, educators, and the processes of 
learning. As Risser is careful to point out, in terms that echo Jardine, the 
hermeneutics of facticity is never reducible to a scheme or rigorous method (e.g., 
the scientific method in Dewey), for it is “neither exegesis nor an art of 
interpretation as in Schleiermacher and Dilthey; rather it is simply the 
operation of philosophy itself that catches hold of life in its activity.”130 With 
this understanding, in light of the ground covered, it is Huebner who inspires 
contemporary educational theorists to continue searching out the value in 
Heidegger’s early philosophy as it might contribute to the betterment of our 
educational practices. 
 
The Potential Implication of the Individual-World 
Dialectic for Education  
 
Authentic education, conceived as unfolding within the individual-world 
dialectic does not adopt the procedural method of establishing goals, aims, and 
purposes of education in advance of learning experiences, as is consistent with 
product-process curriculum design. Rather, it is possible to imagine, in line with 
process-product models for curriculum, the goals and aims for learning and 
authentic standards for education always already immanent as potential in the 
authentic unfolding of the curriculum in progress, e.g., the for-the-sake-of-which 
that education is concerned with is not a determinate, immutable goal posited 
in advance of the learning. In line with the phenomenological-ontology of this 
paper, we might imagine goals and aims emerging through a process of 
hermeneutic interpretation, following a spiral structure, rather than a linear 
design for curriculum-making, educators begin with a fore-conception, or pre-
supposition, concerning goals and outcomes, but these goals and outcomes are 
fluid and protean in nature, they change, evolve, develop and are reworked as 
knowledge and understanding of the student’s needs, wants, desires, and 
abilities are revealed and interpreted by the educator. Although the educational 
aims for student achievement are set forth at the outset of the learning, they 
are more akin to informed suggestions, path-marks for learning, and are always 
subject to revision and elaboration as the educator deepens and clarifies her 
understanding of that which emerges from the learning experience. 
As follows from above, there are crucial ethical implications bound up 
with authentic education concerned with the manner in which we dwell in 
community with others. Since the environmental design of the curriculum is 
grounded in the understanding of temporality and historicality, i.e., the 
authentic heritage, fate, and destiny of educators and students, learning transpires 
within an inclusive, multi-cultural environment, and beyond, depends for its 
authenticity on educator’s embracing the inclusion of the language and cultural 
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forms of knowledge that each student brings to the context of learning. The 
notion of heritage as embodying our living past, the unique collective ethos of the 
student’s given culture, our collective ethos as members of a state and nation, 
the store of unique cultural possibilities that allow for the authentic projection 
into our future as destiny, testifies that education must avoid leveling down or 
excluding the diverse cultural histories and values of our students. 
Understanding heritage as the legitimate founding ground for our future growth 
and development should awaken educators to the necessity of transcending 
unethical and inauthentic practices and policies that socially, culturally, and 
linguistically marginalize students.      
Authentic learning within the individual-world dialectic also embodies the 
ethical aspects of social-based learning, where students learn from each other 
and indeed teach each other in a variety of ways, and is concerned with the 
respectful exchange of ideas in ways that demonstrate care, tolerance, and a 
critical conscious awareness. The communal character of the classroom 
includes the all-important concern for moral development and engenders 
learning through a process of arduous and respectful discourse, which plays 
out in the process of accepting, rejecting, refining, validating, and honing the 
various interpretations that are offered up for debate in shared moments of 
problem-solving, which stress self-development and group development 
through communicative debate. There is recognition of the strengths and 
weaknesses that are either beneficial or detrimental to the personal 
development of the self and group. Educators and students work to arrive at 
common, agreeable solutions to the problems they attempt to solve through a 
process of critical debate, which is always rooted in the ever-changing needs of 
our students and their historical reality, which represents an ever-renewed 
ethical quest for knowledge, understanding, and meaning.     
In addition to the student’s heritage, she also brings a vast store of 
intellectual and emotional experience to the learning context, which holds vast 
potential to make a contribution to ever-growing, ever-developing communal 
archive of student knowledge. Meaning is constructed within the shared 
horizon of “perspectives” through the unfolding hermeneutic and heuristic 
activities wherein student’s interpretations are composed of clusters of 
interpretations, and individual interpretations develop along with, and indeed 
because of, those with whom the student participates within the process of 
authentic learning. Thus, there is an all-important bridge constructed between 
prior knowledge, which is valued as legitimately contributing to the learning, 
and new knowledge. Authentic education also embraces alternative forms of 
knowledge in the curriculum, e.g., human wisdom, meditative thought, 
hermeneutic understanding, aesthetic insight, which allows educators and 
students to approach ontological aspects of their existence in a philosophical 
manner through a rigorous form of non-conceptual and non-systematic 
thought, which avoids the “subjectivist” trap of dualism.131 
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Concluding Remarks  
 
Scientific instrumentalism in education, of which Huebner is critical, is 
represented in the neural psychological-physiological research focused on what 
teachers should know about how students learn. As indicated, Huebner views 
education as becoming “overly dependent on scientific modes of thought for 
shaping values and legitimizing actions,”132 and this affinity for scientific 
thought is also present to teacher-training programs, where “future teachers are 
exposed to the psychological and developmental knowledge of the child and 
man to help develop knowledge of, attitudes toward, and skills for working 
with students.”133 Linda Darling-Hammond claims that educators must have an 
awareness about students’ learning and its implications for teaching knowledge and skills, 
and this knowledge is gained by means of conducting scientific research in the 
following areas: Research on how teachers and students learn; Research on 
teacher learning and its affect on pedagogy and student outcomes; Research on 
learning conditions and teachers effectiveness in structuring and influencing 
learning; Research on brain development, language acquisition, and social 
development.134 Huebner, arguing against privileging empirical research in 
education, claims that the language “furthered and developed by the scientific 
study of the child”135 and educator ignores the more humane and philosophical 
issues of “the place of the adult in the child’s world, the politics of adult-child 
relationships, the child’s participation in the building of public worlds, and the 
art of interpretation about the meaning of life as people, children, and adults 
live together.”136   
Huebner is clear that authentic discourse on education reform cannot 
begin until there is the serious consideration of “the individual, the society and 
the culture or tradition.”137 In light of these aforementioned concerns, in 
“Curriculum as Concern for Man’s Temporality,” Huebner focuses specifically 
on the need for educators to gain a basic “awareness of historicity,” which is 
intimately bound up with “man’s temporality and the concern for it as the 
focus of curricular action.”138 Huebner digs below the surface of the 
curriculum as currently conceived, “penetrating the realities that the everyday 
educator takes for granted,” and illuminates, through a phenomenological 
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approach in thought and language, the ways the “educator has decided to live 
in the world and what he sees as possible futures.”139 It is interesting to note 
that in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, Heidegger concluded that Nietzsche 
remained a metaphysician because he failed to transcend the conceptual-
linguistic constraints of traditional metaphysics. This is why Heidegger required 
a new and unique language to address such issues as the oblivion of Being in 
philosophy; Huebner also seeks out a new and unique language with which to 
begin, perhaps for the first time, to authentically approach the phenomenon of 
education by means of new ways of speaking and thinking poetically, as 
opposed to merely being “socialized into the existing institutions or the 
language generated by them.”140  
It is not about educators finding or inventing new words, resorting to 
catch phrases, or producing new terms for antiquated educational theories. 
Instead, what is required in the first instance is our awakening to the primordial 
power of “essential” language. Huebner, writing on language and teaching, 
speaks of the enduring nature of language in the Heideggerian spirit and seeks 
to understand the poetic, originary naming power of language as it might relate 
to inspiring authentic reforms in education. Language is not the equivalent of 
expressing or verbalizing knowledge through propositions, it is not merely a 
system of codes, signs, symbols, and signifiers, rather in its essence, “language 
is neither expression nor an activity of man,”141 for language in its authentic 
manifestation “speaks” through us in order to, by means of essential naming, 
bring the “presence of what was previously uncalled into a nearness.”142 
Indeed, this is how Huebner conceives language, which allows us to bring forth 
what is concealed into the open by naming the world for the human being. In 
tracing Huebner’s curriculum philosophy back to its origin or source, in 
relating his language and concepts to a unique way of “naming” the truth of 
our historical Being as related to our educational practices, I have tried to 
demonstrate a way in which educators might benefit through understanding 
Huebner’s critical encounter with Heidegger’s philosophy and draw inspiration 
from a reconceived understanding of education so that they might feel 
empowered to reconsider the ways in which they view students and themselves 
in terms of their own potentiality-for-Being as grounded in their historical 
realities, which hold the potential of offering unique possibilities for 
transcendence and emancipation in educational reform. 
 





                                                 
139 Huebner, “Toward a Remaking of a Curriculum Language,” 37. 
140 Ibid., 36. 
141 Heidegger, Poetry, language, Thought, 197-198.   
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